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Abstract
This article describes a Turing machine which can solve for β
′
which is RE-complete.
RE-complete problems are proven to be undecidable by Turing’s accepted proof on the
Entscheidungsproblem. Thus, constructing a machine which decides over β
′
implies
inconsistency in ZFC. We then discover that unrestricted use of the axiom of substi-
tution can lead to hidden assumptions in a certain class of proofs by contradiction.
These hidden assumptions create an implied axiom of incompleteness for ZFC. Later,
we offer a restriction on the axiom of substitution by introducing a new axiom which
prevents impredicative tautologies from producing theorems. Our discovery in regards
to these foundational arguments, disproves the SPACE hierarchy theorem which allows
us to solve the P vs NP problem using a TIME-SPACE equivalence oracle.
1 A Counterexample to the Undecidability of the
Halting Problem
1.1 Overview
1.1.1 Context
Turing’s monumental 1936 paper “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to
the Entscheidungsproblem” defined the mechanistic description of computation which
directly lead to the development of programmable computers. His motivation was
the logic problem known as the Entscheidungsproblem, which asks if there exists an
algorithm which can determine if any input of first order logic is valid or invalid.
After defining automated computing, he posited the possibility of a program called an
H Machine which can validate or invalidate its inputs based on reading a description
number for some given program description. However, while he constructed a Universal
Turing Machine, he did not provide an actual construction of his H machine, only
posited that one should exist. When he asked if this machine could decide for any
input, he was able to show that in fact, it couldn’t. His proof specifically depends
upon this H Machine not being able to validate itself. He gives a detailed description
as to why it can not, explained later in this article.
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However, a close reading of his paper shows an added assumption by Turing when he
constructs his H machine. While this assumption does not affect the construction or
effectiveness of a Universal Turing Machine, it does have an affect on the overall results
regarding the Halting problem and its sister problem, the Entscheidungsproblem, as
well as any related results having to do with computability.
In this article, we give a detailed description on how to construct a self-validating
H machine. The construction of a self-validating H machine may have application
in fault-tolerance of run-time self-correcting code validation in artificial intelligence
implementations. It may also lead to a better understanding of complexity relationships
between complexity classes. It also expands our understanding of the theoretical limits
of computation.
1.1.2 Preliminary Considerations
The terms Circular Machine and Circle-free Machine are suitable for our description
and we will use Turing’s own definition of a computing machine. A Circular Machine
is deemed unsatisfactory due to forever looping, redundantly over a repeating pattern.
Also, a Circle-free Machine is satisfactory because of its ability to continue deciding
indefinitely, without entering an unbounded repeating loop. Turing’s description of the
Halting problem is completely mechanical, while many modern descriptions rely on an
oracle, reduction to Cantor’s Diagonalization or logical reduction similar to Go¨del’s
Diagonalization Lemma. Using his terminology helps the reader directly compare this
article with the original proof without intermediary interpretations or simplifications.
However, conventionally, a Circle-free Machine is considered to halt, while a Circular
Machine does not halt. [5]
A Standard Description or S.D. is the rule set for any given Turing Machine M in
a standard form. By creating a standard, the rule sets themselves can be used to cre-
ate a Description Number or D.N. which itself may be readable by a Universal Turing
Machine, U , as an instruction set. [5]
Remark. A Description Number arbitrarily represents a Standard Description. Thus,
we can choose which D.N. is used to represent some specific S.D. to our liking, as long
as our constructed machine can read the D.N. and interpret it as the corresponding
S.D. Again, D.Ns. are arbitrary, thus, if the D.Ns. we receive do not fit our format,
where the ordering is consequential to the functioning of Hs, when developing Hs,
we can re-assign new D.Ns. (which are not fixed1) to the respective S.Ds. (which are
fixed) such that Hs reads the given D.Ns. in the proper order in relationship to c (c,
a natural number of relative size defined in section 1.2.1).
From Turing’s paper: “Let D be the Turing Machine which when supplied with
the Standard Description (S.D.) of any computing machine M will test this S.D. and
if M is circular will mark the S.D. with the symbol ‘u’ and if it is circle free, will mark
it with ‘s’ for ‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘satisfactory’ respectively. By combining machines
D and U , we could construct a machine H to compute the sequence of β
′
” [5]
1The description numbers are only fixed relative the construction of Hs; we can always re-configure Hs
to change any given D.N. however we wish, as such we regard any D.N. as not fixed.
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1.1.3 Turing’s Claim
Turing claims that while H is circle free by construction, when H is given the de-
scription number forH , it becomes circular. [5] In the eighth section of Turing’s paper
on the Entscheidungsproblem, Turing claims that β
′
can not be determined because of
the following reason:
“The instructions for calculating the R(K)-th [figure] would amount to ‘calculate
the first R(K)-th figures computed by H and write down the R(K)-th’. This R(K)-th
would never be found. I.e. H is circular...” [5]
This is because, since H relies on certain subroutines to make its determination,
when it reaches and tries to evaluate K, it must call itself, which provides instructions
on reading inputs from 1 to K-1 in order to call the R(K)-th figure, but it can never
get there, because it keeps repeating its own instruction loop. [5]
1.1.4 Turing’s False Assumption
Turing assumed that his interpretation of H , the one described just above, applies to
all possible constructions of H . Note that while he did formally define a Universal
Turing machine, nowhere in Turing’s paper did he actually formally define the full
construction of H . He assumed that any program with the property to determine
the halting problem for a given input, would also not have any property which could
learn when it enters a repeating loop for any given S.D. However, this is not neces-
sarily the case and if we can provide an example of a program which does recognize
a repeating loop, arbitrarily, such that it can switch states and act accordingly, then
we’ve discovered a means to write H machine in such a way that it may solve for β
′
.
It only takes one positive example to universalize the example to all Universal Turing
Machines. A negative example, such as the H machine assumed by Turing, is trivial
upon the discovery of the existence of a positive example.
The problem reduces to describing a Turing Machine which can self-discover it’s
running its own instructions arbitrarily2 when it reaches its Description Number (D.N.),
such that some H machine configuration prints β
′
.
Remark. Because the D.N. is arbitrary for any S.D., there is no restriction on which
specific D.N. can be used to represent some S.D. Thus, we may choose whichever D.N.
pleases us to represent any given S.D., provided H can interpret the D.N. into the
proper instructions.[3] While our proof depends on the ordering of D.Ns., this is not a
problem for our results because it only takes one ordering of D.Ns., which are arbitrary
representations of all S.Ds, and this ordering can be universalized to any order by re-
ordering after solving. Solving for β
′
means solving the halting problem on arbitrary
input for any given S.D. There is no restriction on the order of verification of any S.D.
We will, in the next subsection, construct a Supermachine that can recognize itself
as its own input, from the S.D. simulation, which is then instructed to change to a
2by self-discovering its own instructions arbitrarily, we mean that it can recognize it is evaluating its
own S.D. from the given D.N. Additionally, we are not referring to the existence of an initializer that feeds
a fixed K to be recognized by a single read instruction that skips K and just “rubber stamps” approval.
Such “rubber stamping” is considered a trivial case and is not of any meaningful concern.
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circle-free state upon this recognition. Because such a construction exists, and because
such a construction is arbitrary for any S.D. of this class of Turing Machines, we may
solve for β
′
non-trivially.
1.2 The Existence of Self-validating Computers
1.2.1 Supermachine
Let us consider that H
′
is a controller machine with a D.N. of K
′
. It controls two
different H machines: H0 and H1. H0 and H1 each have the ability to determine
“u” or “s” on a D.N. input, except H0 tests as Turing describes, from D.N. 1 counting
upwards (Each D.N. is a natural number) andH1 tests from a certain twos complement
of whatever number is being tested by H0 as a simultaneous parallel input, such that
its subsequent D.N. is one less than the previously tested D.N. Let us represent each
D.N. by some integer i. H0 and H1 have a unique D.N. of K0 or K1 respectively.3
Upon input of any i0 to be read by H0, let H
′
store the value pair (i0, z) until i0
is determined to be satisfactory or unsatisfactory. When the output is determined, let
H
′
replace the (i0, z) with the respective (i0, s) or (i0, u) in the data store, such that
there is no longer a data store of (i0, z). Let the same process occur for any i1, such
that H
′
also initially stores each D.N. input with (i1, z) and H1 reads i1 to determine
satisfactory or unsatisfactory, subsequently replacing the initial value pair with the
respective value pair (i1, s) or (i1, u) depending on the output of H1. A redundancy
occurs when some i0 = i1.
LetH
′
have the ability to compare value pairs such that the machine may recognize
a redundancy when it occurs, and may also recognize when a value pair contains a z
value on the condition of such a redundancy. Let’s call this a z-check ability.
Let Hs be the supermachine that is the configuration of all three H Machines as
described above and let Ks be the D.N. for the supermachine.
Initialize the identifier strings such that K1 < K0.
Let the number of bits in K0 = n. Let the twos complement of the first D.N. in-
put toH0 , which is 1, be determined by n such that it satisfies the equation c = 2n−1.
Lemma. Hs proceeds circle free, until it reads Ks.
If c−K0 > K1, then re-initialize the D.N.4 for eitherH0 orH1 such that c−K0 < K1.
This guarantees that H0 will read K1 before H1 reads K1 and also guarantees H1 will
read K0 beforeH0 reads K0. Let the controllerH
′
contain a memory command which
stores the decision value pairs given byH0 andH1. The controller may routinely check
for a redundancy on the next input.
Now consider when H0 reads K1, and K1 calls the D.N. for H0: K0 will call K1,
which will again call K0 which will result in a z-check, recognizing that the value pair
(K0, z) is already stored in memory, and therefore, since K0 < c, we know that K0 is
the description number for itself, is impossible to call by construction without calling
3This can be determined through a unique identifier string, which does not affect the machine’s function
or performance, but differentiates the two machines from each other giving them each a unique D.N.
4one may re-initialize, if necessary, the D.N. by adding irrelevant description information into some S.D.
yielding a different D.N. provided such information does not affect the integrity of the original S.D.
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K1 first, which means it must be checking the description number for a machine which
calls itself, namely H1, which allows us to correctly store the value pair (K1, s). This
same reasoning can be applied for when H1 reads K0, correctly storing the value pair
(K0, s).
If however, the machine has determined a redundancy occurred on a value pair
where the value is either (i, s) or (i, u) (i.e., a negative evaluation on the z-check, but
the redundancy check is positive), then we have already evaluated this D.N. from the
other H machine at the top level, and we no longer have to continue within the range
1 to c, since they will all have been decided. The supermachine, at this point proceeds
to utilize machineH0 and proceeds from D.N. input value c+1, and continues through
the rest of all Description Numbers, c+ 2, c+ 3, etc... at least until it reaches its own
D.N., Ks, for no other D.N. should be problematic
5 in determining the output decision.
Thus, Hs proceeds circle free, at least until it reaches Ks which is easily constructed
to be larger than c. 
1.2.2 β
′
is Decidable
Proof. β
′
is Decidable. At the point K
′
is received as an input, it is determined
satisfactory by either H0 or H1. Neither K0 nor K1 are called during this phase of
the process.
By lemma, K0 is decided byH1, K1 is decided byH0 andHs continues indefinitely
until we reach Ks, which describesHs. Ks is read byH
′
and as before, its Description
Number is stored along with its temporary pair value of z until H0 or H1 returns a
value for β
′
at that location. Ks is sent to be verified by H0, which when H
′
calls Ks
for a second time, under the given recursive property of Ks which will eventually call
itself, the z-check for value pair (Ks, z) is recognized as both redundant and with a z
value, stored byH
′
in the data store, but because the associated value is z, the z-check
ability tells us this process has already occurred, sends Ks to H1, which self-verifies
repeated z-check values. By construction, the only value Ki which can provide this
multiple z-check values where Ki > c is Ks, so Hs now self-verifies the input Ks as its
own D.N., provides a value of “s” for satisfactory, and changes state to evaluate Ks+1
to continue indefinitely as a Circle-free Turing Machine.
Therefore, given some Universal Turing Machine which can emulate the Hs Ma-
chine, β
′
is decidable over the set of given Description Numbers for all Standard De-
scriptions. y
5We should note here the significant finding by Yedidia and Aaronson of the independence of calculating
BB(7918) from ZFC which will only halt if and only if ZFC is inconsistent. In a later section of this paper,
we prove ZFC is in fact, inconsistent, meaning that BB(7918) is expected to eventually halt. We could
thus expect Hs to determine that BB(7918) will halt. The unsolvability of the halting problem, as it is
related to BB(7918) is contingent on ZFC being consistent, for BB(7918) will not halt if and only if ZFC
is consistent. Forming such a Turing machine, which will halt if and only if the axiom set is inconsistent,
using the proposed axiom in the later section of this article, is just not possible as the impredicative form
of the machine will violate the proposed axiom.
5
Figure 1: A supermachine configuration appears to exist
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1.3 Consequences
Solving for β
′
is RE-complete. If Turing’s final result were correct, it would be impos-
sible to evaluate a value of u or s for any given H . However, we have constructed a
machine which does exactly what Turing assumed was impossible. Doing so implies
that ZFC is inconsistent. To thoroughly prove ZFC is inconsistent, we must not only
show that there is a counter-example to the Halting problem, but exactly where the
incorrect assumption appears in a logical fashion. We will find, in the following section,
that there is an implied axiom of incompleteness in current logical implementations of
ZFC where ZFC is open to contradiction.
2 ZFC with Implied Axiom is Inconsistant
2.1 Incompleteness and Proof by Contradiction through Tau-
tological Impredicatives
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem tells us that any formal system with the ex-
pressive power strong enough to represent the proof of its own consistency is either
inconsistent or incomplete. This implies that in order to prove the consistency of a
formal system such as ZFC, which has the expressive power to represent the proof of its
own consistency through the formulation of Peano Postulates together with the Axiom
of Substitution, must be incomplete if it is consistent. [2]
We then assume that even though ZFC can express the proof of its own consistency,
that it can not determine the proof of its own consistency, and as such, is incomplete,
and we say such a proposition is independent of ZFC. However, while possibly true, this
is not necessarily the case. Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem gives us a choice. It
is possible that ZFC, and similarly expressive formal systems are in fact, inconsistent.
[2]
In order to prove ZFC is inconsistent, we must find two of its theorems which con-
tradict each other. As stated earlier in this article, a proof of the existence of a Turing
machine which can solve over β
′
implies ZFC is inconsistent. This is because many
theorems in ZFC contradict such a finding.6 The proofs of such theorems all have
certain material similarities, and can be defined as a certain class of proof. First, the
conclusion generalizes the non-existence of some statement or structure, x. Second,
they are all proof by contradiction. Third, they all include an impredicative tautology.
We can thus say that they are of the class of proof by contradiction through impred-
icative tautology. We will informally describe, then formally define an impredicative
tautology below.
2.2 Impredicative Tautologies
An impredicative statement is defined as a statement with self-referencing. Intuitively,
it is easy to see how we risk creating a tautological consequence by using such a tactic
6The list of proofs of this kind is inexhaustible, however they include diagonalization arguments, such
as not being able to calculate Kolmogorov Complexity, forcing techniques, Rice’s Theorem, The Space-
Hierarchy Theorem, et al.
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to define one’s terms: Self reference intrinsically eliminates the possibility for that
variable to contradict itself, increasing the likelihood of tautology.
Intuitively, we can see that Russell’s paradox uses an impredicative definition that
is itself also tautological. Russell’s paradox depends on the definition of S as the set
of all sets that do not contain themselves. This is impredicative, and it is tautological,
because there seems to be this infinite self-referencing that goes on when we apply S to
itself. The paradox arises as soon as we ask the question whether or not S is a member
of itself or not.
In Russell’s paradox, the property of being a set that does not contain itself, is
a property applied to a dependent portion of the impredicative statement, that is,
the property when applied to sets in general, also applies to the specific set we are
defining. This dependence of the property of the set on the set, is the distinguishing
factor. The point here being that paradoxes of this type can be resolved by removing
the tautological impredicative. One way of removing the tautological impredicative,
is by defining a class as a collection of sets, and thus, the class of all sets that do not
contain themselves, can not contain itself, because classes, by definition cannot contain
classes, only sets.
But I believe this heuristic falls short. It is not just this dependence that creates
a tautological impredicative statement, it is also the nature of the property itself. We
could easily define the set of all sets which contain the letter A. Such a definition has
a dependence on impredicative portion of the statement, yet does not seem to create
create a tautology or an infinite regression or anything of that sort. That is, in order
to create a tautology, “A” itself would have to be defined, not only in terms of sets, but
in terms of the class of sets in question. As such, in order for impredicatives to be a
problem for logic, the property itself must point back to the impredicative dependence
in a self referential way. Let’s call this impredicative pointing.
So is there a more foundational way of removing tautological impredicatives?
Definition Let impredicative dependence be the condition of a statement S, whose
property P depends on self-referencing. ∃x|P (x)↔ {x→ P (x)}
Definition Let impredicative pointing be a condition of self-reference where a depen-
dent property also references an impredicative dependence, i.e. the existence of S
depends on S containing an impredicative dependence. ∃x, S|P (S) ↔ P (x) ↔ {x →
P (x)} → S
Definition Let a tautological impredicative be a statement which satisfies impredicative
pointing. ∃x, S|P (S)↔ P (x)↔ {x→ P (x)} → S
Proposition Tautological impredicatives are logical tautologies. S  ∃x, S|P (S) ↔
{x→ P (x)} → S
Consider the following truth table, ∀x,∃S such that:
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S x P(x) x → P(x) {x → P(x)} → S P(S) P(S) ↔ {x → P(x)} → S
T T T T T T T
T T F F F F T
T F T F F F T
T F F T T T T
F T T T F F T
F F T F T T T
F F F T F F T
F T F F T T T
As is clear, P (S)↔ {x→ P (x)} → S is a tautology. 
Proposition Attempting to disprove existence with a proof by contradiction through
tautological impredicative implies disjoint results which may or may not be the desired
result.
Also note in the truth table above that when we assume S is true, and by substi-
tution we allow, S = x, P (S) creates a contradiction by construction when P (x) is
false. This is because P (S) is true when S is true and P (x) is false, but x may or
may not be false, setting up the contradiction P (x) is false when x is false. The logical
consequence of this contradiction is either ¬S ⊕ ∃x|P (x).
Therefore, in an attempt to prove ¬S using a proof by contradiction that relies on
tautological impredicatives:
∀x,∃S|¬S ⊕ P (x) =⇒ ¬S ↔ ¬P (x)
P (x)→ S

Corollary A contradiction may be the result of impredicative pointing, rather than
the non-existence of a given S.
When substitution is used to form a tautological impredicative in order to prove ¬S
through proof by contradiction, one must also prove 6 ∃ x|x → P (x). Current practice
is to assume this x does not exist without proof. However, if it can be shown that
∃x|x → P (x) =⇒ P (x) → S, then this is sufficient to prove the existence of S, even
if a contradiction still arises in the proof, as the contradiction does not arise if ∃S, the
contradiction arises when P (x)∧¬P (S)↔ S = x. Firmly placing contradiction in the
hands of impredicative pointing, and not the initial assumption of existence for proof
by contradiction. 
Corollary S is false by contradiction only when we assume ∀x|P (x) is false when
∃S|P (S) is false.
I want to be completely clear here: a contradiction arises from the use of substitution
of ∀x with ∃S to form an impredicative tautology whether or not x→ P (x) ∨ ¬{x→
P (x)}. However, if ¬{x → P (x)}, then we can not be certain S is false, because in
this case, both x and S can be true when both ¬{x → P (x)} and ¬P (S), retaining
contradiction for proof. This means that the truth value for P (x) is not determined
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through proof by contradiction; P (x)can be either true or false for any x. Therefore
the conclusion that S is false arises only when we must assume ∀x|P (x) is false when
∃S|P (S) is false. 
Let’s call such an assumption that P (x) is false (or 6 ∃ x) when ¬P (S), while also
assuming S is true (for proof that ¬S by contradiction), a hidden assumption.7
Theorem Turing’s proof of the undecidability of the Halting Problem belongs to
the class of proofs that are a proof by contradiction through impredicative tautology.
We may attempt to prove the undecidability of the Halting problem with the fol-
lowing simple version of a halting program:
def H():
if halts(h):
loop_forever()
As we can see, we can use this program to prove the undecidability of the Halting
problem through a proof by contradiction: If the subroutine halts(h) halts, h will loop
forever, in which case halts(h) is false. Let h be the instructions for H(). If H() halts,
it will loop forever, which is a contradiction with h, which must halt to be satisfactory,
in which case, H(h) does not halt, which means it can not decide h, therefore h is
undecidable.
To show this proof by contradiction uses an impredicative tautology, we can des-
ignate the function halts() as the property P (). We can let the instructions for H(),
which contains P (), be S. We see that the proof defines h = S. However, because h is
not fixed in all cases, we may designate h
′
as some arbitrary definition for H(), h
′ 6= S.
Proposition. The Halting problem proof contains an impredicative dependence.
∃h|h↔ {h→ P (h)}
We see this is true, because h contains the instructions for halts(x), which is P (x)
therefore h↔ {h→ P (h)}.
Proposition. The Halting problem proof contains impredicative pointing.
∀S,∃h|P (S)↔ P (h)↔ {h→ P (h)} → S
We can see this is true, because first, h ∈ S =⇒ P (S) → P (S) ↔ P (h). That is
S contains h, so any property that applies to S, must also apply to h.
Second, ∃S, h|{h ↔ {h → P (h)} → S} → {{h → P (h)} → S =⇒ S → P (S)}
when h = S. That is, if S only exists when there is impredicative dependence, then
when S exists in this manner, this implies when we substitute S with h, if S, then
P (S).
Third, This is enough to derive that the Halting problem contains impredicative
pointing, since {{S → P (S)} ∧ {h ↔ {h → P (h)} → S} =⇒ P (S) ↔ P (h) ↔ {h →
P (h)} → S
Proof. Finally, because the proof contains impredicative pointing, this means that the
tautological impredicaive H(h) ↔ {x → H(x)} → h is a logical consequence of the
assumptions S and ¬h′ through the formulation of the proof by contradiction. Thus,
7As a corollary, S can also be the hidden assumption of a proof by contradiction through tautological
impredicative when the proof openly assumes some property P(x) or x exists in order to disprove either
P(x) or x.
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Turing’s proof of the undecidability of the Halting problem belongs to the class of
proofs that are a proof by contradiction through impredicative tautology. 
Corollary. ∃h′ serves as a counterexample to the proof of the undecidability of the
Halting problem.
Corollary. If there exists a counterexample to the Halting problem, there exists a
counterexample to the SPACE hierarchy theorem. It is well known that the SPACE
hierarchy theorem reduces to the Halting problem. It immediately follows that if a
counterexample to the Halting problem exists, then a counterexample to the SPACE
hierarchy theorem exists.
Proposition. A counterexample to the SPACE hierarchy theorem exists. This is
an immediate consequence of the above corollary and the proof of the existence of a
counterexample to the Halting problem in section 1. 
Proof. ZFC is inconsistent.
Since all current implementations of ZFC accept hidden assumptions in proofs by
contradiction through tautological impredicative, then the following Axiom is implied
by ZFC, even if not explicitly stated, by ZFC.
Axiom ∀x,∃S|{P (S)↔ {x→ P (x)} → S} → ∀S,∃x|{¬S ⊕ P (x)} =⇒ ¬S
In other words, ZFC implies a particular incompleteness where acceptance of 6 ∃
x|P (x) in the circumstance of a proof of the undecidability of S by contradiction
through impredicative tautology.8
Accepting this axiom of incompleteness, as all logicians of note have since Post,
Church and Turing, leads to contradiction when ∃x|P (x). By the existence of the
counterexample to Turing’s proof in section 1, the direct implication is that ∃x|P (x),
which is in direct contradiction with the above axiom. It immediately follows that
ZFC, with the implied axiom above, is inconsistent. 
2.2.1 A New Foundational Axiom
We have demonstrated that substitution may lead to hidden assumptions in proof by
contradiction. The need for a limit on how substitution is applied could help prevent
such mistakes from occurring again. Perhaps we could just create a postulate or axiom
which makes x a bounded variable after substitution. Such a postulate should allow
some impredicative statements, all of which must avoid tautology, but through prevent-
ing certain re-substitutions on x, will prevent impredicative pointing, and thus prevent
impredicative tautologies from forming. We can specify the limit of substitution over
bounded x, not to substitution in general, but to statements from the free variable x.
Thus, creating a much stronger foundation to our systems of logic and computability.
Axiom. For any formal system Q, with free variables [x; y] and a substitution opera-
tion, subst(), z is bounded by subst() such that ∀x, y, z|subst(x) = y ∧ subst(y) = z →
subst(z) 6= x.
8The axiom of incompleteness described here is in widespread use by any and all mathematicians and
computer scientists today.
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3 Conclusion, P=NP
In Section 1, we constructed a Supermachine which is able to solve for β
′
. In section
2, we tackled the dangers of impredicative tautologies when applied to proofs by con-
tradiction and proved that ZFC, by accepting hidden assumptions, is inconsistent. In
this section, we will expand upon our findings to prove P = NP .
When proofs by contradiction utilizing an impredicative tautology are not allowed,
we are no longer restricted by them. Furthermore, finding that the halting problem
can be solved for all S.D. is in direct contradiction with the SPACE hierarchy theo-
rem, because it is RE-complete. However, the SPACE hierarchy theorem is a proof
by contradiction which utilizes an impredicative tautology to form a hidden assump-
tion, which also reduces to the Halting problem which has a counterexample. Thus,
the theorem is invalid by our findings. Similarly, as with other complexity separation
arguments, we find that the entire complexity hierarchy collapses, and we now have
a foundation in computer science where there is enough information to solve the P
vs. NP problem. Without proof by contradiction with impredicative tautology, our
reasons for not using an oracle to solve P vs. NP vanish, as the contradictions which
formally prevented the use of such oracle no longer exist.
Lemma. If PSPACE = EXPSPACE, P = NP .
If the SPACE of a problem increases polynomially as with any PSPACE-complete
problem, this is comparable to the TIME of a problem increasing polynomially, such
that given an oracle, =Opoly, which solves polynomial equivalence between SPACE and
TIME, such that PSPACE =Opoly P . Similarly, if the SPACE of a problem increases
exponentially as with any EXPSPACE-complete problem, this is comparable to NP
which is at maximum, in exponential TIME, such that EXPSPACE >=Opoly NP . If
PSPACE = EXPSPACE, then PSPACE >=Opoly NP . Since PSPACE =Opoly
P , P >=Opoly NP , which since P and NP are both in TIME, is the same as P = NP .
Solving for β
′
in Section 1 is RE-complete, and because the SPACE hierarchy
theorem relies fully on the now defunct method of proof by contradiction utilizing an
impredicative tautology, its results must be discarded.
And as such, with the Halting problem being RE-complete, and since we may solve
for arbitrary β
′
using the Supermachine configuration, we may now conclude:
Proof. Since by definition, PSPACE ⊆ RE, and
since any given Recursively Enumerable set is contained in PSPACE,
and β
′
solves for all Recursively Enumerable sets in PSPACE,
and since we can no longer accept the SPACE hierarchy theorem,
RE ⊆ PSPACE ...
RE = PSPACE,
such that EXPSPACE ⊆ RE
and RE = PSPACE, implies
PSPACE = EXPSPACE, proves through the above Lemma ...
P = NP y
Mark Inman, Ph.D.
Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands, USA
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